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SIGNALLING AND EXCESS RETURNS FROM
VENTURE CAPITAL BACKED FLOTATIONS
by   J.  Strang
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the UK Venture Capital market with particular focus on the
experiences of venture capitalist backed flotations. Management buyouts are focused
upon in particular to attempt to determine if recent evidence of superior returns to
investing in MBO backed flotations is evidenced by their share price performance in
the immediate aftermarket. No such evidence is found in the study conducted but
evidence points to a strong ‘signalling’ effect given by the involvement of venture
capitalists in corporate flotations.
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SIGNALLING AND EXCESS RETURNS FROM
VENTURE CAPITAL BACKED FLOTATIONS
1.  INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the UK venture capital market with particular
reference to venture capital backed stock market flotations. Empirical evidence from a
number of sources including HSBC James Capel1 and the Centre for Management
Buyout Research at the University of Nottingham2 indicate that venture capital backed
firms produce superior stock market returns when compered to the broad universe of
all new issues floating on the stock market.
This study will attempt to test this phenomenon for the data set available. The
organisation of the paper is as follows. Section two introduces the venture capital
industry in general. Section three provides more detail on management buy-outs in
particular while Section four discusses the recent findings in the area of MBO
research in more detail. Section five contains the methodology for the study
undertaken and the empirical results while Section six presents the conclusions of the
work.
2.  VENTURE  CAPITAL
                                                          
1 ‘New Issue Overload’, HSBC James Capel, London, 1995
2 Center for Management Buyout Research, Spring Quarterly 1996, University of Nottingham
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Venture capital is a method of financing the start-up, development, expansion or
purchase of a company. In following the process the venture capitalist acquires an
equity stake of the company in return for providing the funds.
It is an equity based financial instrument which may be very relevant for external
funding of some categories of new, growing or established businesses. However, it is
not always appropriate, particularly if the business connot demonstrate the potential
for dynamic growth. Consequently, it is crucial to correctly identify exactly when
venture capital is an appropriate source of finding. Using venture capital funds in an
inappropriate situation can have serious consequences.
Deciding whether or not venture capital may complement or substitute for other
sources of finance available to a business is not complicated but does require the
involvement of a number of professional advisers.
As shareholders in the business, venture capitalists receive their return through
participation in increasing levels of profits and on the eventual sale of the investment.
This can be achieved by selling their shares to management, by means of a trade sale,
or by the company achieving a listing on the Stock Exchange.
Venture capital has different characteristics to other sources of finance. The main
difference between borrowed money and venture capital equity relates to asset
security. Bankers are rewarded by interest and capital repayment and the amounts
borrowed are usually secured either on the business assets or the individual
shareholder directors' personal assets. As a last resort, a bank can bankrupt a business
if the business defaults.
Venture capital financing is not secured and venture capitalists take the risk of failure
just like other shareholders. Because of the risk, venture capitalists require an
appropriately high rate of return. Consequently, venture favour financially sound
investee companies led by managers of proven ability.
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The investment period is usually between three and five years but can exceed ten
years. The amounts invested tend to be over £100,000 averaging just over £1 million
in 19943.
An investment by a venture capitalist into a growing company will impose greater
discipline on the investee company. Its likely that areas such as the provision of
management information and Board procedures will come in for particular attention.
A venture capital funding structure can allow substantial returns to management if it
performs successfully. The expectation of management is that their reduced holding in
the company will produce a greater capital gain than would have been possible if the
funding had been obtained from other sources. This return will be through capital
growth.
A popular means of tying managements ultimate reward to that of the venture
capitalist and other equity investors is via a ratchet mechanism which increases
managements’ equity stake depending on company performance. Performance targets
can relate to profitability, exit price or a target annual rate of return achieved by the
institutional investor. Obviously, management needs to consider carefully the extent
to which they will have control over achieving these targets.
One of the protections required by the venture capitalist will be that investee
management remuneration levels are appropriate to the company's performance. This
provides an extra incentive for managers to ensure that targets are reached.
Venture capital flunking allows a company to remain in private hands, thereby
avoiding the regulation and public scrutiny associated with a stock exchange listing.
The presence of a venture capitalist as a shareholder will lend credibility to the
business and raise its profile.
2.1  Raising Venture Capital Funding
                                                          
3 Venture Capital in the UK: A Report and Guide to the Venture Capital Industry, HMSO, London
1996 p1
5
Although venture capitalists claim equity is available for businesses requiring from as
little as a few tens of thousands of pounds up to hundreds of millions of pounds, small
amounts are very difficult to raise, particularly from institutional investors who
provide most of the flinging involved. This is personified in the ‘equity funding’ gap
in the UK.
A properly structured venture capital arrangement should be put together in such a
way as to obtain a capital gain for both the investor and the investee that should
outweigh any measurable costs. Such costs include the shareholding and
corresponding partial control over operations that is given up to the venture capitalist
in return for funding. These may broadly be described as ‘adency’ costs.
Venture capital is relatively expensive because it involves a high degree of risk for the
lender. As a function of the risk profile, a venture capital provider will require a
substantial rate of return (often in excess of 25% per annum) on the amount invested.
This return will usually consist of a running yield in the form of dividends and capital
growth achieved on the sale or flotation of the company.
The precise return sought by the venture capitalist is governed by the quality and track
record of the management team and the risks associated with the nature and size of the
business. Higher returns are sought from early-stage businesses because they represent
a greater risk. Few institutions are therefore willing to provide finance of less than
£100,000. Institutional flinging is most readily available for established businesses
seeking equity funding of over £500,0004
It is exceptionally difficult for entrepreneurs and businessmen to acquire venture
capital funding if their potential investee company or start-up project does not have
the characteristics and the type of management team that attract venture capital
providers.
                                                          
4 HMSO Report ibid p2
6
One of the key factors that providers consider is the 'entry level' of the investment
required, that is, the stage of development or evolution of the investee company and
consequently the amount of funding it requires.
In general venture capitalists are keener to finance expansions, management buyouts
and buy-ins (so-called ‘development capital’) than they are to finance seedcorn, start-
ups and other early stage companies. This is due largely to the additional risk that is
associated with early stage ventures and the time and costs involved in financing
smaller deals compared with the benefits. In essence, it maybe that venture capitalists
are more willing to provide development capital them venture capital.
2.2  The Various Stages of Venture Capital Investment
There are a number of different stages of investment which characterise the venture
capital market. They can be summarized as follows:
Seedcorn
This concerns the research and development of a business idea before it is actually
launched on the market. It may involve producing a prototype a product or the design
of a package for a service industry. It may also include initial research in order to
assess the size and scope of potential markets.
Such early stage development projects require a certain level of funding. This may
vary considerably according to the nature of the underlying product or service -
involved and the amount of research and length of time that is needed to develop and
test it fully. However, it is generally assumed that projects offices kind call for
relatively small sums of money, with a possible maximum of £lOO,OOO.
It is in the nature of this development stage that the risk profile for the investor is
particularly high. In contrast with a well established company with a developed
product and share of its given market, it cannot be assumed at seedcorn stage that the
product or service will achieve acceptance or win any market share at all. In addition,
if the entrepreneur or managers do not have the right kind of experience and a proven
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track record in business development, the risk for the potential funding partner rises
still further. Consequently, many venture capitalists avoid such early stage financing.
Start-Up
It is at the start-up stage that the product or service is initially marketed commercially.
A new operating company may need to be set up and staff recruited, while the
company's premises may also need to be equipped and a distribution network
established.
As in the case of seedcorn investment, its unlikely that either the product or the
company can be assumed to have proven itself commercially. Consequently, the risk
for the investor is a high one and many venture capital providers prefer to avoid start-
up projects.
Other Early Stage
The British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) defines this stage as one at which
the product has passed its development stage and requires further funding in order to
develop both production and sales. Although the product or service may already have
been launched, it is assumed that it is not yet generating profits.
Like the seedcom and start-up stages, this is not popular with the mainstream venture
capital providers since it still involves an essentially unproven product or company. It
is regarded as a high risk area for investment.
Expansion Funding
This stage involves the expansion of a company which is already established and at
least breaking even in financial terms. It may, according to the BVCA, also be
growing profits. However, its aim in seeking venture capital funding is to expand its
production capacity, recruit extra staff; extend its marketing or product development
programme or acquire additional working capital.
The company and/or the product is already well established and the company's
management can be assumed to have at least an adequate level of experience. This
kind of investment is therefore considered to be significantly less risky than the earlier
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stages and, as such, it attracts venture capital much more easily. It is most probably
also much larger.
Development Capital
Development capital is widely regarded as forming a separate category in terms of
entry levels. Here, financing is required to develop an alternative product or to expand
by acquiring one or more already established companies. If a company in this position
has a good performance record, a project of this kind will be regarded by venture
capitalists as being on a par with expansion funding as far as risk is concerned.
Management Buyout (MBO)
In a management buyout, funding is sought to enable the existing operating
management, and possibly also investors, to acquire a business that is already
established and working. As an established business, such a project is regarded as a
relatively low risk in venture capital teems and MBOs have in fact been growing in
popularity among venture capitalists in recent years. This rise to prominence has at
least in part been driven by business refocusing and subsequent divestment by large
organisations.
Management Buyin (MBI)
In this case hiding is sought to enable an external manager or group of managers to
buy in to an existing company. Again, the business can be assumed to be well
established and the management wishing to buy it to have an appropriate level of
operating experience.
MBIs are also generally regarded as a relatively low risk proposition by venture
capitalists. However, given that the management group wishing to acquire a company
is obviously less familiar with it than are managers bidding for a MBO, their project
may be regarded by venture capitalists as a less attractive proposition than a MBO.
Secondary Purchase
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The BVCA defines a secondary purchase as the purchases of shares in a company
from a venture capital firm or, alternatively, from its existing shareholders. This is
also assumed to involve an established company with an experienced management,
proven products and a good performance track record. To the extent that this is the
case, it will be regarded as a relatively low risk potential investment by the venture
capitalists.
2.3  Venture Capitalists Approach to Different Entry Levels
In 1994, some 68% of the number of financing made by BVCA  members went into
the expansion stage, 18% went into MBOs and MBIs and 14% into early stage
including start-ups. However, 68% of total funds went into MBOs and MBIs, 28%
into expansion and 5% into early stage investments5
The way Venture Capitalists approach the various different entry levels may be
usefully examined by looking at them in terms of the amount of funding owners or
entrepreneurs require for their projects.
The diagram below provides a rough guide to the situation faced by company and
investor alike.
                                                          
5 HMSO Report ibid p8
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The diagram presents two main points. Firstly, that there are very few institutional
investors interested in seed funding, start-ups and involvement in funding in general
below £100,000. Secondly, the substantial majority of institutional venture capital
funds prefer to back management  teams and companies who require equity funding in
excess of £250,000. This size focus indicates the concentration of interest on
development capital.
It is clear that the most difficult end of the venture capital funding spectrum in terms
of attracting funding is the bottom end.  Basically, the smaller the amount of finance
required, the harder it is to raise. This gives rise to the previously mentioned ‘equity
funding’ gap. This relates to the gap in the number of venture capitalists prepared to
                                                          
6 HMSO Report ibid p8
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get involved in high risk (and smaller) equity funding. Simply, there is enough
business available offering lower risk and high enough potential returns for the
venture capitalists to ignore the high risk part of the market completely. However, it
may be that this situation changes as the UK venture capital market becomes more
competitive and mature.
Some venture capital funds seek to specialise in certain industry sectors such as
biotechnology, computer related and other high-tech areas. Others actively avoid
sectors such as property or film production. In general however apart from a few
'niche' players, venture capitalists are prepared to consider most industrial sectors. The
quality of the management team and whether there is a proven product in an
expanding market is of more concern.
In 19947 the general industrials sector (engineering, electronics, building construction,
chemicals, paper, textiles etc.) represented the largest industry sector of
investment by BVCA members in terms of number of companies financed. The
services category (leisure, hotels, transport and distribution, retail, media etc.)
represented the largest sector by amount invested.
The amount of investment varies greatly with the stage of investment. Start-up and
other early stage investments are almost without exception lesser in amount than
expansion and MBO/MBI investments. In general few investments of less than
£100,000 are made by the industry unless there is a good opportunity for a second
round of financing.
In 1994 the average overall size of investment by BVCA members across categories
was £1.3 million, with £429,000 for early stage, £565,000 for expansion and £4.9
million for MBO/MBI investments8.
For investments of less than £100,000 (the 'equity gap') there are various seed capital
funds available, both independent, government sponsored and part of larger venture
                                                          
7 HMSO Report ibid p9
8 HMSO Report ibid p9
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capital organisations. ‘Business angels9’ are perhaps the current largest source of
smaller amounts of equity financing. Business Links (one-stop shops offering advice
and help to small and medium-size businesses) and Training and Enterprise Councils
(TECs) also maintain information about the availability of smaller amounts of seed
capital and of private individuals seeking investment.
In 1995 Venture Capital Trusts (VCTs) were introduced. These are specially designed
to assist companies looking to raise under £1 million.
When seeking venture capital funding, company owner shareholder management must
be prepared to invest some of their own capital in order to demonstrate personal
financial commitment to the venture. As a rule of thumb the executive directors
should be willing to invest one years salary into the venture or about 10%10 of the
equity capital.
2.4  Due  Diligence
Due diligence is a vital part of the venture capital investment decision and extensive
work will be undertaken by the potential venture capital provider regardless of what
stage of financing is sought.
    Venture capital due diligence is conventionally defined as the process of discovery,
confirmation and clarification of the key essentials of a business in the mind of a
venture capitalist. On this basis he will decide whether or not to invest and, if so, on
what terms. Consequently, as commonly stated by venture capitalists, due diligence
'begins at the first meeting'.
    Due diligence is crucial to the venture capital process. This is somewhat disingenuous
as the venture capitalist will typically invest multi-million pound sums into unquoted
businesses about which he may initially know very little, which are not readily
marketable and where the prospect of any recovery on a winding-up will be remote.
                                                          
9 These are high net worth individuals who place capital with small growing companies
10 HMSO Report ibid p10
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When properly undertaken, venture capital due diligence should be all-encompassing,
detailed and searching. IT can also take considerable time. Indeed, in the words of one
distinguished corporate financier [ref], the main difference between transactions led
by venture capitalists and those arranged by corporate financiers lies not so much in
the source of money, but in the way the due diligence is handled. Corporate financiers
tend to rely on others for their assessment of an acquisition: the venture capitalist does
it himself'.
In overview, the venture capitalist will be concerned with all aspects of the target
business, both those aspects verified by specialists such as patent agents and when due
diligence is performed in-house.
Perhaps the most critical issue for the venture capitalist in the evaluation process will
be the quality of management. In the words of one US venture capitalist,
'there is no question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or
odds (financial  criteria),  it  is  the  jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally
determines whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all'.
A key part of the venture capitalist's analysis will be to take references on
management. These can vary from the use of enquiry agents to informal social
conversations with friends or acquaintances.  Typically, combined  with  trade
references,  and  in  some  cases  taken  without management's knowledge. This
process can be unpleasant and unnerving for the entrepreneur. It is, however, essential
and be informative, as this type of third party endorsement will provide the venture
capitalist with in many ways his best evidence that he is about to make a good
investment.
2.5   Different Types of Funding Provider
The prospective investee company must realise that there are a number of different
types of venture capital provider and each essentially has a slightly different s agenda
depending on what type they are.
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Some suppliers of capital are independent companies which invest funds raised
principally from institutions such as pension funds and insurance companies. Others
are subsidiaries of banks which draw on the parent's resources for the funds they
invest. Others again are investment trusts which take in funds from both institutions
and private individuals. The investment decisions of all types of providers depend on
the extent of their funding resources and their own particular targets and strategies at
any given time.
Like all types of investors, individual venture capital providers have their own areas of
interest and it is often possible for an investee company's management team to shop
around for the right investment package. In order to find a provider who is prepared to
accommodate their particular needs, it is therefore important that such managers study
the investment strategies of prospective investors.
Essentially venture capital providers base their investment criteria on the entry level,
size and value of the project, the industrial sector involved and the region in which it
is located.
For example, some are unlikely to invest in start-ups or to provide growth capital but
may instead concentrate on MBOs. Some focus on a single region of the country or on
specific industrial sectors.
Investors also vary in terms of their philosophy towards their relationship with
investee companies. Some may wish to appoint one of their own executives to the
investee company Board, while others take a more detached, 'hands-off approach.
However, all providers will wish to monitor the investment project regularly
throughout its life.
2.6  Different Funding Schemes
As well as there being a wide variety of different venture capital funding providers,
there are also a variety of different ways in which the venture capital financing
package can be constructed. Different situations call for different financial packages to
be constructed and in particular the proportions of equity to debt.
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The proportion of debt to equity will clearly depend on the investors own investment
strategy but it will also be closely related to the nature of the business. A cash-
generative business can carry a lot of debt because the debt can be serviced out of
profits. A young high-tech company, on the other hand, may show no profits for
several years and what will attract investors is the prospect of eventual, longer term
capital gains. In such cases the investor will obviously look for a substantial equity
stake.
In most cases the venture capital provider seeks to be a minority shareholder in the
investee company. For instance, for a moderate-sized MBO it can be possible for the
management team to hold perhaps 60% of the equity assuring them of control of the
company while the investor holds, say, 40%. At the same time, the equity would be
geared up with debt to meet the purchase price. In other words the managers, whose
personal resources are probably reasonably modest, will have become owners of a
sizeable business.
In large MBOs the managers will hold much less of the equity, and the majority of the
ordinary shares will be in the hands of a syndicate of investors. No single investor
likes to hold a minority of the shares, since this concentrates the risk in the hands of a
single organisation. It is also likely to be a disincentive for the management to
perform well.
Investors also expect managers to make a substantial personal commitment to the
project in terms of investment made from their own resources. This demonstrates their
faith in the business and also provides a real financial incentive to make the business a
success. On the other hand, investors recognise that the really important contribution
which manager bring to the party is so much money, but rather skill and talent.
Because of this fluid mix, the structure can be quite flexible. Investors vary
considerably, however, in how much they involve the managers in the construction of
the package. This underlines the importance of checking the particular interests of the
prospective venture capital funding provider. In addition to the preferences over the
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funding structure, the prospective investee company may want to consider the
business preferences of the venture capitalists under consideration.
2.7  Formulating an Exit Plan
A crucial decision in investment strategy relates to time-scale, and the question of the
investor's 'exit'. This depends crucially on the life of the venture capital fund. For
instance, some funds have a life of ten years or more. Given this, some investors have
longer time horizons than others and are prepared to allow investment projects to
develop over a period of some years before they realise their capital gains (e.g., 3i).
Others invest over relatively short periods. Some venture capitalists, being funded by
limited life partnerships (e.g., Candover), will seek a sale of the business at between
three and seven years from the date of their investment. It is likely that the equity
funding structure will reflect this timescale and failure to exit can result in onerous
cash dividend payments being paid to the venture capitalists, possibly to the detriment
of the business.
Again, the nature of an exit may be important determinant in persuading a venture
capitalists to invest. Many providers will only invest in businesses which have a clear
exit strategy, that is, a plan by which management will grow the business to the point
where it can be sold or floated within a given time limit.
However, some are not concerned with the manner in which they eventually exit from
the investment project but are only concerned with its profitability and with the extent
of their own  gains.
Despite agreeing objectives at the time of investment, it is not uncommon for conflicts
to arise between a management team and its institutional shareholders over the most
appropriate time to sell. The venture capitalist is answerable to its underlying
investors and is focused on the need to provide the highest overall return per annum.
2.8  Different Exit Routes
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There are a number of different exit routes available to the venture capitalist and the
investee company. Obviously, both have to agree on the chosen method of realising
the exit. The choices the face are discussed in this section.
For management teams who have received an injection of development capital or
carried out a management buy-out or management buy-in backed by venture
capitalists, assessment of available exit routes from the project would seem to be a
relatively straightforward exercise.
However, different venture capitalists may well have different expectations of their
investments, particularly with regard to exit. The majority of venture capitalists
manage third party funds or are organisations linked to such funds. As a result their
performance is closely watched by the outside fund providers. Invariably their
performance is measured by the average annual percentage increase in the value of the
money invested in a particular company, which is more commonly known as the
internal rate of return (IRR). In a competitive market those venture capitalists which
achieve above average IRR's are more likely to attract further outside funds in the
future.
The very nature of the IRR calculation means that cash flows to venture capitalists in
the early years, through dividend yields, early redemption of loan capital or preference
shares and, most importantly, early capital realisations which can have a large and
favourable impact on the fund's overall IRR performance.
If a management team can realistically foresee and exit within three to five years then
a relatively short term independent fund with agreed exit horizons may well offer
management the best deal. However, any management team should bear in mind that
management teams do not sell or float within the staled time-frame. In order not to
create a conflict of aspirations at the outset of the deal, management should determine
realistically the likely exit route and the most realistic timescale and  ensure that their
aspirations  and expectations are shared by their financial backers.
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A low yield, exit-driven structure which includes financial incentives (for example, a
ratchet to reward the management team for an early exit) may well offer the
management team the best deal in the marketplace with regard to equity participation
but its implications should be understood. The need for an exit may become an
overriding requirement and a management team that wished to remain independent
and become a public company could find itself being required to pursue a trade sale in
order to preserve the deal which was originally negotiated by them.
Investment houses which are prepared to take a longer term view with regard to exits
and which place more emphasis on a running yield over time will still make
assumptions with regard to a likely exit route and the value which is realistically
achievable at that time. Again, the management team should be comfortable with the
assumptions that are being made.
Certainly a trade sale or flotation are the most common exit routes and it should be
that the earlier an exit is achieved the higher will be the likely rates of return to those
involved. It is probably fair to say that management are encouraged to seek an early
exit. This is a little simplistic. It disguises a complex issue which should be given
detailed consideration prior to the initial investment. Furthermore, statistics show that
the majority of investments do not achieve an exit within five years.
Two alternative exit routes to a trade sale or flotation are worth mentioning briefly.
One potential option is refinancing, whereby the same or a new team of venture
capitalists provide finance to acquire the shares of some or all of the existing
management team and/or of the original financial backers. The other is the purchase
by the company of its own shares.
The diagram below shows some of the different routes available
Table 2
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Source - HMSO Report ibid p48
Trade sale
A trade sale will normally be managed by a financial adviser who understands the
unquoted market and has both credibility and experience in selling companies.
Depending on the size of the business the financial adviser may be a merchant bank, a
specialist boutique or a firm of accountants. The financial adviser would be expected
to have contacts within the specific market sector in which the business operates and,
if the size of the business makes it possible that a foreign buyer may be considered.
The financial adviser would normally assist in the preparation of an information
memorandum on the company which would provide information to potential
purchasers. This would enable them to put forward their best price, while preserving
the confidentially of commercially sensitive material, as some potential purchasers
may also be competitors. In conjunction with the company, the financial adviser
would draw up a short-list of the most likely potential buyers together with a reserve
list.
A tightly controlled auction involving a limited number of serious potential buyers is
invariably the best way of maximising the exit value. Potential buyers on the reserve
list would not normally be contacted unless insufficient interest was forthcoming from
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the initial list or price expectations were not being met. The auction process is likely
to last three to four months and negotiations will usually be led by the financial
adviser. Tight control of the process is crucial.
After a second round involving perhaps two or three of the highest bidders, a preferred
bidder will be chosen with whom final negotiations will be conducted. The financial
adviser should ensure that significant concessions are not lost during the final
negotiations, particularly in the areas of warranties and indemnities, or through last
minute manoeuvres by the purchaser to reduce the purchase price.
The following diagram outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the trade sale.
Table 3
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Trade Sale
Advantages Disadvantages
Management and investors may sell their
entire shareholding
Management may lose independence
Trade sale can be sacrries out for any size
of company
Further retains unlikely unless partial sale
deal
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Quality of management is not critical Business may face restructuring at the
hands of the trade buyer
The track record and prospects can be
variable
Timing is flexible
Weaknesses in the business can be dealt
with
A buyer can rectify commercial
management problems
Contractual arrangements can cover
specific difficulties
Trade sales can command higher values if
a specific buyer places a high value on the
business
No ongoing worries
Source - HMSO Report ibid p49
Flotation
A public flotation is a wholly different transaction from a trade sale. In this case the
financial adviser is co-ordinating and managing the whole process of bringing the
company to a public market and, as sponsor, is fulfilling on behalf of future
shareholders many of the responsibilities that a corporate buyer would undertake
himself The complexities of a flotation actually mean that it is a longer process than a
trade sale, typically lasting some six to seven months. The public liabilities associated
with the issue of prospectus are substantial and onerous.
Much attention will be focused during the flotation process on the suitability of the
company for a public listing and indeed the process is unlikely to be initiated unless
the financial adviser has already reached the preliminary conclusion that the company
is suitable. The financial adviser should consider the following criteria.
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The quality and continuity of management; history and profit record over at least a
three year period; prospects and, in particular, likely developments in markets and
products and commitment of existing shareholders.
Management should ensure that their expectations and aspirations are not at odds with
the preferred exit route.
If management finds itself uncertain as to which exit route to take it is best to follow
one's instincts in the face of such doubts!
The following table outlines the advantages and disadvantages of a flotation.
Table 4
Advantages and Disadvantages of a Flotation
Advantages Disadvantages
Management retain independence Management and investors may only be
able to sell a proportion of the investment
Access to new/cheaper sources of finance Price will depend on market conditions
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to fund growth
Liquid market for company shares Timing may not be flexible
Continuing incentives/motivation Exit transaction likely to be more difficult
and costly
Prospects for enhanced investment value Flotation may only be available to larger
companies
Increased status and public recognition
for the company
Quality of business and management are
essential and any problems are likely to
preclude floating the business
There are significant regulatory
requirements and commitments
Source - HMSO Report ibid p50
Refinancing
Secondary refinancing or secondary buy-outs are becoming more common, although
they still account for a relatively small percentage of exits. This method of exit may be
attractive as a method of passing on ownership of the business to the next generation
of management. It may be necessary because of the age profile of the management
team or the emergence of an able and ambitious lower management tier. Alternatively,
it may be that one or two members of the management team, who have an interest in
the original transaction, would also be involved in the refinancing. This can lead to an
interesting conflict of interests during negotiations and great reliance being placed on
the skills of the financial advisers involved.
Purchase of Own Shares
The achievement of an exit for a financial investor by the target company purchasing
its own shares from the investor is relatively rare. The increase in the value of the
business over time is always likely to be greater than its ability to fund an acquisition
of its own shares if it meets the financial investors' required rates of return. It may,
therefore, be largely ignored as an exit route for the purposes of this discussion, as it is
likely to be encountered only in circumstances where the business has not performed
well and the exit is not being made voluntarily.
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2.9  Trade-Offs in the Investment Decisions of European Venture Capitalists
Venture capitalists are relative outsiders to the business and the management team and
consequently have to use other criteria when assessing the viability of the investment.
Numerous studies have been conducted in the USA but relatively little work has been
carried out in the Europe. Studies have sought to identify which decision criteria
venture capital investors feel are most important. Zopounidis11 concludes that there
are ‘..great diversity of evaluation criteria and their relative importance from one
study to another..’ but ‘..the criterion of the management team is considered
predominant...’.
Hence there are a number of questions that remain unanswered from the perspective
of venture capital investment in the UK and Europe.
1. What are the key investment factors used by European venture capitalists in
evaluating potential investments?
2. Are the factors consistently applied by venture capitalists throughout Europe.
3. Are there clusters or groupings of venture capitalists based on the decision criteria
applied?
Indeed, these very questions were posed by Muzyka, Birley and Leleux12. They
conducted a survey to examine the issues facing European venture capitalists and how
they dealt with the issues raised in the questions outlined above.
The authors examined their data using co-joint analysis. This method was chosen as it
would mesa quantitatively the relative importance of a list of attributes set against
each other. The method is based on requesting the decision maker to make a series of
paired trade-offs determining which of two given factors, all else being equal, is the
more important.
A review of the literature produce 35 key evaluation criteria which could be grouped
into the following seven categories.
1. Financial Criteria - related to the apparent financial aspects of the investment.
                                                          
11 Zopounidis, C. 1994, ‘Venture Capital Modelling: Evaluating Criteria for the Appraisal of
Investments’, The Financier ACMT 1(2) May : p54-64
12 D. Muzyka, S. Birley and B. Leleux, ‘Trade Offs in the Investment Decisions of European Venture
Capitalists’, Paper presented for publication in the Journal of Business Venturing 1995
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2. Product-Market Criteria - related to market size, maturity and growth.
3. Strategic-Competitive Criteria - related to strategic positioning of the investment in the
marketplace.
4. Fund Criteria - related to the constraints of the investment fund.
5. Management Team Criteria - related to the potential track record of the lead entrepreneur and the
management team.
6. Management Competence Criteria - related to the competencies and/or capabilities of the
management team in important functional areas.
7. Deal Criteria - related to the stage and nature of the investment deal.
Using these 35 criteria a questionnaire was developed which required the respondent
to make 53 trade-offs between pairs of independent criteria. The collected data was
then transferred into the cojoint model in order to compute the relative rankings of he
investment decision criteria. The rankings by individual were then correlated to test
for similarity among respondents and as input to an unweighted pairwise cluster
analysis algorithm. The cluster analysis would show whether any groupings of venture
capitalists based on decision criteria existed.
73 institutions across Europe from a broad range of backgrounds completed the work.




Time to break even 12
Time to payback 20
Expected rate of return 11
Ability to cash-out 9
Product-Market Criteria
Degree mkt. already established 19
Market size 29
Seasonality of product markets 33
Sensitivity to economic cycles 30
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Market growth and attractiveness 18
Uniqueness of product / technology 17
National location of business 27
Degree of product / market understanding 10
Strategic - Competitive Criteria
Ease of market entry 24
Ability to create post entry barriers 14
Sustained share competitive advantage 6
Nature and degree of competition 26
Strength of suppliers and distribution 25
Fund Criteria
Business meets fund constraints 15
Business and product fit within fund
portfolio
28
Ability of investors to influence business 21
Location of business relative to fund 35
Table 5 (contd)
Management Team Criteria
Leadership potential of mgmt. team 2
Leadership potential of lead entrepreneur 1
Recognised industry experience in team 3
Track record of lead entrepreneur 4
Track record of management team 5
Management Competence Criteria
Marketing/Sales capabilities of team 7
Organisational / administrative capabilities
of team
16
Financial/Accounting abilities of team 8
Deal Criteria 13
Stage of investment required 23
Number and nature of deal co-investors 32
Ability to syndicate deal 31
27
Scale and chance of later funding rounds 34
Importance of unclear assumptions 22
Source - Muzyka et al, ibid, p20
What is immediately obvious from the table above is the importance attached to the
management of the company.
Overall, the venture capitalists surveyed exhibited a great deal of consistency in the
relative importance they attached to the decision criteria considered in selection of
investments. The table below shows the relative number of criteria from each of the
seven groups that appeared in each quintile of the overall rankings for the individual
factor rankings given above.
Table 6
Top Quintile Second 20% Third 20% Fourth 20% Bottom 20%
Mgmt Team 5
Mgmt Comp. 1 2 1
Strat - Comp. 1 1 3
Financial 3 1
Product - Mkt 1 3 1 3
Fund 2 1 1
Deal 2 3
Source - Muzyka et al, ibid, p19
The pattern is worthy of note. While the relative importance of the management team
is not a surprise, the lowly importance of the Product - Market grouping may be seen
as surprising.
The findings suggest that venture capitalists as a group prefer to select an opportunity
which offers a good management team and reasonable financial product and product-
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market characteristics, even if the opportunity does not meet the overall fund and deal
requirements. This is interesting in terms of the implications for IPOs. If venture
capitalists are doing deals which are not ideal fits with their funds then their
propensity to unwind from them should be high.
In empirical work carried out in the USA by Barry, Muscarella and Vetsuypens13 the
relationship between venture capital investment and levels of aftermarket underpricing
is examined. The authors find no difference in the mean level of underpricing between
venture capital backed firms and those which are not venture capital backed. This is
contra to the evidence presented in the UK.
3.  MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS AND MANAGEMENT BUY-INS
The main topic of this chapter relates to MBOs and their close relation, the MBI.
Consequently, in this section the subjects are discussed in more detail.  The
management buy-out (or MBO) is now an accepted and established feature of the
financial market. The modern MBO was imported from the United States in the late
1970s and early 1980s. The number of transactions completed increased rapidly
following the general relaxation of some of the legal complexities surrounding the
deals. Venture capitalists have reacted positively to buy-outs and as the market has
grown, a whole industry, consisting of buy-out funds, mezzanine and senior debit
lenders, financial advisers, accountants and lawyers specialising in buy-outs has been
built up around it.
The first MBOs were small with the average transaction size less than £2 million. The
market itself totalled less than £100 million14. The major source of dealflow at this
stage was recession hit companies divesting non-core businesses. Finance was
provided primarily in the form of equity from the small number of venture capitalists
                                                          
13 C.B. Barry, C. J. Muscarella and M. R. Vetsuypens, ‘Venture Capital and Initial Public Offerings’
Unpublished working paper, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tx, 1988
14 HMSO Report ibid p77
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established at that time. The companies that survived the recession in the early 1980s
were either sold or achieved a flotation on the stock market.
As a result of this early success the MBO market took off in the middle 1980s. Many
well known names went through the buy-out process during this period including
Woolworth, Parker Pen and Premier Brands. During the height of the Thatcher years
managers became millionaires, with a number of venture capitalists following suit
through their investment schemes.
Following the rapid growth of buy-outs during 1989 and 1990 newspaper headlines
such as 'Buy-out and Burn-out heralded the demise of MBOs. A few high profile
failures in the UK and the collapse of the junk bond market in the US prompted David
Owen to remark that 'the growth of leverage buy-outs is a good example of doctrinaire
free enterprise shooting itself in the foot. A diagram showing the number of
companies using venture capital in the UK over the years is included in the graph pack
with this chapter.
3.1  The Current State of the UK MBO Market
In practice, the difficulties of the late 1980s and the early 1990s served to regulate the
market. Structures became less geared and business plans more conservative. The
volume and size of transactions has since grown steadily. The buy-out market has
stabilised at around £3 billion15.
Graph 2 in the graph pack charts the total transaction value of UK buy-outs for the
period 1990 to 1994. The value of transactions has increased as the country recovered
from recession and the funds dedicated to MBOs have increased. The average size of
transaction has also increased over the period. 1994 saw an even higher level than
1989 with some £3.7 billion of MBOs completed. To put the MBO market size in
context, in 1994 the total market for corporate control in the UK was £9.9 billion.
MBOs represented approximately one third of this number16. The buyout market is
therefore an important part of the UK mergers arid acquisition market.
                                                          
15 HMSO Report ibid p77
16 HMSO Report ibid p79
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Graph 3 in the graph pack charts the total estimated number of UK buy-outs and the
total number of UK merger and acquisition transactions for the period 1990 to 1994.
This shows that the number of MBOs fluctuate between 500 and 600 in number. This
represents on average 50% of the merger and acquisition market. By comparison in
1984 the estimated total number of buyouts completed was 250 which represented
30% of the mergers and acquisition market. So not only have buyouts increased in
number, but they have also grown as a proportion of all corporate sanctions. Clearly,
the management buy-out is growing in popularity as a method for disposing of
subsidiary businesses.
The reasons for the increasing trend quite are clear. It is now widely recognised that
giving management a stake in a business is an important motivating factor.
Management teams usually have a strong desire to run their own business and to make
more money as shareholders than they could merely as employees. At the same time,
parent companies often like to sell to local management to ensure continuity of the
business. To those companies Seeking the highest price, management teams are
generally still able to compete effectively, using in depth knowledge gained in the
business over many years.
3.2  Sources of Buy-outs in the United Kingdom
The buyout companies themselves can come from all possible sources including UK
listed and unlisted parent companies, overseas parent companies, privatisation and
receiverships. Whole listed companies have also been subject to buy-outs by
management.
The largest single source of MBOs in the UK is divestment from parent companies,
representing just over half of the total deals transacted in 1994. In the early eighties
such divestments were an even more important source of deal flow and up to 65% of
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deals came from this source. Buy~uts from foreign parents represent between 10%
and 15% of the total17.
The next most important source is buyouts from family ownership, which now
account for 24% of all MBOs. It is this source of deal flow that has always been
claimed as the most important source in Continental Europe. The commonly advanced
explanation for this goes as follows.
Many businesses were formed across Western Europe at the end of the second world
war by entrepreneurs who have now reached retirement age and are intending to live
off the fruits of their past labour. Their family may be unable to continue with the
business, a trade sale may be unattractive and managers themselves often need an
incentive to progress the business further. Selling to the existing management is
therefore a good solution.
However, this argument is not entirely convincing. While buyout statistics in
Continental Europe are not as well developed as in the UK, those that do exist show
that this source has still to be proved as important as was once forecast.
A third source is buyouts from receivership. In 1992 these grew to nearly 20% of the
total. By 1994, however, they had fallen to 5%, showing that this source fluctuates
with the economic cycle.
The number of privatisation buyouts has declined as the Government  disposal
program  has  progressed. However, the rail privatisation and continued port and bus
sell-offs have ensured continued activity in this sector.
The number of buy-outs of listed companies has been a relatively small but constant
source of transactions. However, they have generated considerable interest due-to
their size and particularly to a perceived conflict of interest. For example, the utilities'
role as service providers may conflict with their new, commercial aim of profit
maximisation. Public buyouts will probably continue as before, although a lot depends
on relative pricing in the quoted and unquoted markets.
                                                          
17 HMSO Report ibid p79
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3.3  Recent Trends in Buy-out Funding
The structure of buy-outs has evolved since the 1980s. Early buyouts were financed
primarily with equity, but during the late 1980s financing became more geared. Partly
in response to the difficulties experienced by highly-geared buy-outs and partly due to
the difficulties in obtaining senior debt from the banks, gearing has declined
significantly in the 1990s.
Despite a number banks returning to the MBO market in the last two years structures
have remained similar to the early 1990s with senior debt was scarce.
New venture capital funds have been raised, no doubt enticed by the high returns
achieved by venture backed buyouts, particularly following good exits as the Stock
Market recovered from 1993 onwards. However, as the proportion of debt is
decreased and equity increased, the reduced leverage tends to cut the overall return to
the equity investors. To some extent mezzanine has filled the gap left by the reduced
amounts of available senior debt and this is a more cost effective option than using
venture capital.
Increasing use of vendor finance has also been a feature of the buy-out market
recently. It may be that this is at the expense of mezzanine finance, although this has
only been the case in one or two particular deals. A more likely answer is that it is a
good way to accommodate the gap in price expectations between vendors and
acquirers. The gap can be bridged by including in the financing an element which, for
various reasons, the vendor and acquirer value differently. Thus, the acquirer gets an
effective price reduction while the vendor achieves his expected price for the disposal.
3.4  Management Buy-ins
Whereas buy-outs depend being in the right place at the right time, management buy-
ins add additional flexibility to the market in order to help achieve deals which might
otherwise not take place.
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Financially, buy-ins work in the same way as buy-outs, the only difference being that
management are brought in from outside to fill gaps in the management team or
provide a completely new team able to develop the business in a different way.
The dividing line between buy-outs and buy-ins is not a distinct one, but the Centre
for Management Buy-out Research has identified 145 buy-ins in 1994, the number
having risen from 30 in 1985 to a peak of 148 in 1989.
Buy-ins frequently arise from family-owned businesses where there is no clear line of
management succession and the owner wishes to retire. Other typical sources include
receiverships and sales of divisions of larger companies which lack the complete
management team required for the division to trade as a stand alone business.
The other notable feature of management buy-ins is that they are higher risk than
straightforward buy-outs. They involve management teams which are new to the
particular business concerned and so lack the intimate and detailed knowledge of the
company, its strengths, weaknesses and future potential. The individuals may not
have worked together as a team before so are an untried combination with no
guarantee of success.
3.5  Recent Developments in Favoured Exits
Trade sale is the most popular form of exit which, while showing a decrease in time of
recession, continues as an exit source. Flotation is the next most regularly used but is
far more cyclical in nature. Between 1990 and 1992 this source fell to almost nothing
whilst receivership rose during this period. Since 1993 flotations of buyouts have
increased while receivership has men. For instance, in 1994 34% of all flotations
(including MBOs and others) were venture backed companies18.
It should also be noted that of all the buyouts, even early ones in 1982, 40% have been
'recorded as not having obtained an exit
3.6  Conclusions
                                                          
18 HMSO Report ibid p82
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As economic conditions have changed over the past five years, the buyout industry
and financing structures have also evolved. New financing instruments such as
mezzanine have found an important role and the market continues to innovate. The
buyout industry has weathered the last recession well. Transaction size and numbers
are increasing and future prospects look  relatively rosy providing there is not a return
to the highly geared deals of the late eighties.
4.  MBO FLOTATIONS - RECENT EVIDENCE
The aim of this chapter is to examine MBO companies which subsequently realise an
exit by floating on the Stock Exchange. This section presents some recent evidence on
the phenomenon.
4.1  Recent Developments in the UK MBO Market
The press and institutional investors themselves are sceptical about MBO
managements and their backers using flotations to get rich quick. Development
Capitalists have been accused of  floating companies which are not ready for flotation.
There have certainly been cases of this but the fat remains that MBO flotations do, in
general, outperform the stock market even if there are one or two flotations which in
the recent past have gone badly wrong.
In the period from the first of January 1993 to the first of January 1995 there were 130
flotations in the UK. Of those 130, 75 were venture capital backed. In aggregate these
companies had a market capitalisation of some 7.7 billion pounds sterling and a sum
of 3.6 billion pounds sterling was raised. Overall, these venture capital backed floats,
which include MBO’s, have outperformed the FT-All Share index by 6.3% and their
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respective sectors by 9.5%. This sets their performance comfortably ahead of the
universe of IPOs as a whole.
HSBC James Capel19 continue to favour MBO flotation candidates as they usually
bear the following traits. They have detailed ‘due-diligence’ undertaken at the time of
the MBO and consequently tend to be solid businesses. They tend to be completely
focused on one business area and consequently often perform better than their
competitors. They have an advanced understanding of the value of cash an working
capital management, often having had to bear heavy debt and the associated banking
covenants of the buy-out structure. Partly as a consequence of the last point, they tend
to have high quality and prompt financial reporting systems. Finally, the agency
problem is mitigated to an extent due to the often significant equity ownership by the
management.
A point frequently overlooked by institutions is that not all venture capitalists are the
same. The behaviour of the different interest groups at flotation and in the aftermarket
can be very different. If an investee company is floated, Limited Partnerships tend by
statute to be required to distribute the shares in the buy-out company in specie to their
limited partners. The residual shareholders are often overseas investors who are not
natural holders of the equity. Consequently they often sell quickly in the aftermarket.
Buyout investors such as CINVen are not required to distribute in this way. They are
measured in a ‘cash in versus cash out’ basis and consequently can add and do hold on
to their residual shareholdings for some time after the float only releasing their
position when they feel the time most appropriate. Similarly, 3i the largest venture
capital player in the UK market is not forced to sell stock on flotation nor is it obliged
to sell before a certain period into the aftermarket. Insurance company venture capital
departments do not have to sell and very frequently pass the stock on to the quoted
sides. The clearing bank buy-out departments are generally sellers because its how
they best refresh their funds available for new buyout opportunities.
The number of buyout and buy-ins floats during 1995, twenty nine, was significantly
down on the forty nine of the previous year and thirty six of 1993.  The period to
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flotation of buyouts increased from the level of around three years nine months which
had been sustained for the previous three years to 4 years, 8 months20.
There was a sharp decline in the importance of flotation as a means of giving
employees the opportunity to own shares.
First year price performance of 1995 buy-out floats was the best of the period 1992-
1995, with an actual average price improvement of over a third (35.5 percent) and a
relative price improvement of over a quarter (25.5 percent).  Relative long term out
performance has also been achieved in the CMBOR Index (sponsored by River &
Mercantile). By the end of March 1996 this had outperformed the Hoare Govett Small
Companies Index by 40.1 percentage points since its base date.
4.2  Current  Trends
Recent times have seen a considerable reduction in the level of buyout and buy-in
flotation activity compared to 1993 and 1994. While, overall, the number of new
issues on the Official Market has fallen, sentiment towards buy-out and buy-in
flotations was adversely affected by several large flotations in 1994 which
subsequently performed very badly.
The number of buy-out and buy-ins floats during 1995, twenty nine, was significantly
down on the forty nine of the previous year and the thirty six of 1993. Of the total
buy-out and buy-ins floating, almost a third (nine) were management buy-ins, a record
number.
Not only was the total number of buy-out floats considerably lower than the previous
year, but their average size, £54.9 m, was also much reduced. Consequently their
initial total market capitalisation was little more than two fifths of the previous year's
level. In contrast the average buy-in was larger than both that achieved the previous
year and that of 1995 buy-out floats. The total market capitalisation of buy-ins floating
almost doubled to £74 m21.
                                                                                                                                                                     
19 ‘New Issue Overload’, HSBC James Capel, London 1995
20 CMBOR Quarterly Review p27
21 CMBOR ibid p28
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Some of the key characteristics of Buyout and Buyin flotations in the period from
1992-1994 are listed in the table below.
Table 7
Key Characteristics of Buyout and Buyin Flotations
MBO MBO MBO MBI MBI MBI
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995
Mkt Cap.
- Total
1941.3 2665.6 1097.2 365.8 328.0 740.6
Mkt Cap.
- Average












48.2 49.6 31.7 57.7 50.1 44.5
Ave. P/E 15.8 13.5 14.8 13.7 22.8 14.3
Ave.
Yield





3.9 3.9 4.8 3.9 4.2 3.1
Number
floated
30 43 20 5 5 9
 Source - CMBOR ibid p28
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Similar trends were also seen in the amount of funds raised at float with substantial
reductions form buy-outs but increases for buy-ins. The more difficult conditions for
new issues were perhaps reflected in the percentage of the enlarged share capital being
offered at the time of float decreasing significantly, particularly for buy-outs. This
level was the lowest since the late 1980s.
Average PE ratios moved in opposite directions for buyouts and buy-ins. Despite the
problems of flotation, but perhaps reflecting the overall high stock market indices for
part of the year, the average PE ratio of buy-outs increased. Those of buy-ins declined
from the unusual levels of the previous years.
The period to flotation of buy-outs increased from the level of around three years nine months which
had been sustained from the previous three years as a group of early and mid 1980s buy-outs came to
market. In contrast several buy-ins floated only a very short time after float.
4.3  Characteristics of Recent Management Buy-out Companies
Although two of the floated buy-outs and buy-ins could trace their origins back to the
eighteenth century, those floated were on average post-war rather than pre-war as in
the past two years. Some of the details of the Buyout and Buyin firms floated in 1993-
1995 are listed in the table below.
Table 8
1993 1994 1995
Year Founded 1939 1934 1947




















Net Assets in year
pre-float
9.0 5.1 8.5
No. of employees 1337 986 578
Source-CMBOR ibid p29
The average market capitalisation on float of buy-outs and buy-ins together was
marginally up on the previous year reflecting the number of larger buy-ins. This was
despite the inclusion of AIM market stocks.
The longer period between buy-out and float is likely to be one of the main factors
behind both the broad maintenance of market capitalisation levels, despite the
companies on average having a smaller valuation at the time of buy-out or buy-in, and
the increase in the average net assets of the companies in the year before flotation.
There was also a considerable reduction in the average net borrowings of the
companies in the year before flotation.
The average size of company in terms of average number of employees was
substantially reduced, with only six of the floated buy-outs and buy-ins employing
more than one thousand lull time employees.
There were major variations in the profitability of the companies, with five making
pre-tax losses and four operating losses in the year before flotation.
Examination of the original sources of all buyouts and buy-ins which exited in 1994
and 1995 shows that those which were originally divestment’s from a UK parent were
by far the most likely to exit through a flotation. In contrast, those bought from family
or private shareholders were very unlikely to exit through a float despite their
importance as a source in the overall buyout and buy-in market








1994 1995 1994 1995 1994 1995
Rec.ship 8.3 14.3 5.7 11.7 14.6 17.2
UK
Parent
58.3 57.2 36.8 40.4 43.8 40.6
Foreign
Parent
10.4 7.1 12.6 9.6 14.6 5.1
Private 10.4 7.1 20.7 27.6 20.8 29.7
Priv-ation 6.3 14.3 23.0 9.6 20.1 1.6
Going Pvt 6.3 0.0 1.3 1.1 4.1 7.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sample 48 28 87 48 48 64
Source-CMBOR ibid p29
The CMBOR examined new issue prospectuses to determine the reasons stated for
flotation. The results of their study are shown in the table below.
Table 10
Reason Total Number Total %
Pay-off buyout loans -
personal
19 65.5
Pay-off buyout loans -
company
24 82.8
Realise part of VC 19 65.5
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investment
Expansion - General 26 89.7
Expansion - WC 9 31.0
Expansion - Fixed Capital 3 10.3
Expansion - Acquisition 13 44.8
Status 19 65.5
Employee share ownership 10 34.5
Source-CMBOR ibid p30
Clearly,  reasons may be influenced by advisers suggesting a set pattern of responses.
Nevertheless some important changes were noted compared to the same
classifications for 1994 flotations. The two most important reasons stated (although in
reverse order from 1994) were for general expansion purposes and to pay off buyout
loans taken on by the company.
Flotation also gives the opportunity for management and venture capital providers to
sell some of their holdings at the time of flotation. There was significantly less
inclination to do this during 1995, reflecting the concerns of the market as to the long
term commitment of previous stockholders following the disappointing performance
of several floated buy-outs in 1994. Indeed there were a number of cases where no
shares were sold at all and several where directors increased their holdings.
Previous studies suggest that the extent of share ownership both at the time of buyout
or buy-in and following a subsequent flotation may be closely associated with
performance. Traditionally employee participation at the time of flotation has been
given priority. Evidence shown above indicates a sharp decline in the importance of
flotation as a means of giving employees the opportunity to own shares. just over a
third of new issue particulars suggested this compared to nearly two thirds the
previous year.
Further support for declining involvement of the wider employee body was seen in the
arrangements made for employees to obtain shares at the time of float. This fell
significantly to under three fifths of buyout and buy-in flotations. There was little
42
change in the percentage of companies having general share option schemes although
there was, surprising]y, a decline in the incidence of executive schemes.
After float the percentage of equity held by directors and management, 24.7 percent,
was higher than in the previous year (21.9 percent). This may reflect the smaller
original value of transactions and the larger number of 1980's buy-outs, where
management equity holdings were larger than more recently completed deals, as well
as the smaller overall percentage of the enlarged share capital being sold at the time of
flotation. There were large variations in insider share ownership between companies;
some 17 percent of companies, a similar level to 1994, had management stakes of at
least 40 percent.
In line with the reduction in buy-outs and buy-ins floating in 1995, the number of
buyout float millionaires declined from seventy five in 1994 to fifty, five in 1995.
There was however an increase in the percentage of managers having an initial
flotation stake of between £lm and £2m. While considerable publicity is given to the
millionaires, it is interesting to note that just over a quarter of executive directors, a
similar proportion to 1994, have share stakes worth less than £0.25m on flotation.
Among other post flotation stake holders, there was a slight increase in venture capital
share of the equity to 29.2 percent. With the lower amount of equity being offered,
only two fifths (39.7 percent) emerged in public ownership immediately after
flotation22.
The extent to which individual venture capital firms may seek to exit their investee
companies through flotation rather than other forms of exit may to some extent reflect
different preferences and funding sources.
4.4 Stock Market Performance of Recently Floated MBOs/MBIs
This section contains detail on the main features of individual company performance
in 1995.  Unlike the very varied individual performance of buyout and buy-in
flotations seen during 1994,  1995s’ new issues had an overall more satisfactory price
                                                          
22 CMBOR ibid p31
43
performance as measured both in terms of actual share price movements and relative
to the FT-All Share Index.
On this basis the ten best performing floated buyouts and buy-ins, or 34.5 percent of
the number coming to market in 1995, had a relative share price out-performance of at
least three tenths with five of at least 50 percent. In comparison with last year, four of
this year's floats outperformed on a relative basis the best of the 1994 floats23. Only
three of this year's floats performed worse than 10 percent below the Pr-All Share
Index compared with nine
(18.8 percent) the previous year.
First year price performance of 1995 buy-out floats was the best of the period 1992-
1995 with an actual average price improvement of over a third (35.5 percent) and a
relative price improvement of over a quarter (25.5 percent). These figures include
reverse-in stocks and AIM flotations24.
This improvement was particularly marked in comparison with the initial performance
of 1994 buy-out and buy-in floats where there was only a very marginal price
improvement. During 1995 there was a marked improvement in the actual share price
of 1994 floats reflecting general stock price improvements; the overall relative
performance worsened slightly.






1992 Floats to 31.12.92 +23.8 +10.5
to 31.12.93 +70.4 +24.0
to 31.12.94 +62.5 +31.3
to 31.12.95 +70.0 +16.9
1993 Floats to 31.12.93 +28.2 +2.1
                                                          
23 CMBOR ibid p33
24 CMBOR ibid p33
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to 31.12.94 +3.2 -4.5
to 31.12.95 +28.2 -1.4
1994 Floats to 31.12.94 +0.9 +3.0
to 31.12.95 +15.3 -0.7
1995 Floats to 31.12.95 +35.5 +25.5
Source-CMBOR ibid p34
Looking at performance characteristics, the best performers (as in 1993) have been
medium sized buy-out and buy-in companies- those where the original buy-out or buy-
in value was between £l0m and £30m. Clearly, successful deals of this size will have
increased their market capitalisation considerably by the time of float, which explains
the better performance of buy-outs and buy-ins in 1995 which had an initial market
capitalisation of over £3Om.
As noted earlier, the average period to float was considerably longer in 1995 than in
the previous few years. In 1992 and 1993, although not 1994, the best performers were
buy-outs and buy-ins which had taken three or four years to float. This period again
produced good performance with companies outperforming relative to the FT-All
Share Index by almost a third (31.7 percent).
In both 1992 and 1994 floats where less than 50 percent of the enlarged share capital
was offered for sale had performed more satisfactorily than those where more than 50
percent had been offered. This was again the case in 1995.
The increase in buy-ins being floated was accompanied by a sharp reversal of their
performance relative to buy-Outs. Whereas in 1992/94 buy-ins had outperformed buy-























<£10m +22.0 +6.5 +5.3 +7.5 +23.8 +11.7
£10m-
£30m
+45.8 +0.3 +2.9 +4.9 +76.9 +63.0
£30m+ +22.2 +6.0 -4.4 -2.2 +11.2 +5.7
Mkt Cap.
on Float
<£30m +25.5 +4.3 +3.1 +3.9 +18.5 +7.7
£30m+ +28.9 +1.4 +0.1 +2.7 +46.5 +37.1
Period to
float
<3yr +26.9 +9.7 -5.7 -2.9 +32.4 +24.4
3/4 yr +25.1 +9.5 -0.7 -0.3 +44.9 +31.7
5yr+ +37.1 -28.2 +11.9 +14.7 +24.5 +17.3
% sh. cap.
offered
<50% +17.1 -0.2 +2.4 +4.2 +39.8 +29.5
>50% +39.1 +2.2 -0.9 +1.7 +19.8 +11.0
MBO? +31.3 +12.3 +17.0 +20.1 +7.5 +2.5
MBI? +27.7 +0.4 -1.0 +1.0 +46.7 +34.7
Source-CMBOR ibid p35
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The debate over the longer term performance of floated buy-outs and buy-ins has led
to the establishment of an index, the CMBOR Index of buy-out and buy-in floats. This
has been sponsored by River & Mercantile.
The CMBOR Index comprises those companies listed on the London Stock Exchange
which have previously been subject to a buy-out or buy-in as defined by CMBOR.
Companies included are revised daily to include new flotations and to take off
companies which have subsequently been subject to some form of second exit. The
base date for the CMBOR Index is end 1990 and the Index includes all buyout and
buy-in floats which were quoted at that date. The Index has been calculated since July
1995, and on a daily basis since January 1996. Recent results from the index are










CMBOR Index +118.7 +28.7 +20.1 +7.2
FTSE All
Share
+78.6 +21.2 +18.5 +2.3




+79.0 +17.8 +9.7 +7.4
Source-CMBOR ibid p35
As is shown in graph 4 in the graph pack, relative price out-performance has been
achieved by the Index since its formation. Between its base date and the end of March
1996, the out-performance relative to the FT All Share Index has been 40.1 percentage
points and against the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index 39.7 percentage points.
For the fifteen months to March 1996, the Index increased by 28.7 percent compared
to 17.8 percent for the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index
5.  STUDY METHODOLOGY AND DATA
5.1  The Study Data
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The data used in this study is concerned with initial public offerings made on the Main
Market and the Unlisted Securities Market of the London Stock Exchange. The study
period spans six years from July 1989 to June 1995.
The dataset was constructed in the following manner. Data on companies floating was
obtained from KPMG Corporate Finance, London. The information provided included
financial information on floating companies and information on the relevant
professional advisors. This information was cross-referenced against information
provided by the Quality of Markets Department at the London Stock Exchange for
accuracy. Pricing data for the IPO companies was obtained from DataStream
International and cross-referenced against a second source courtesy of FactSet Ltd.
The initial dataset containing pricing data included some 302 companies.
The final sample consists of 175 companies. The average level of excess return
achieved by the sample constituents was on the first day of trading was 7.9%. This
level represents the index adjusted return from the floatation price to the mid-market
price at the end of the first day’s trading. All flotation methods are considered in the
analysis. but as indicated in the Keasey and Short25 study, the placing method is that
most favoured by companies.
The following table indicates the flotation methods chosen by companies.
Method Number
Placing 109
Placing  / Offer for Sale 31
Placing / Intermediaries Offer 33
Offer for Sale 1
Others 1
Total 175
5.2  Model and Variables
In the analysis to follow, the level of underpricing is defined as:
EXRTNi = [(Pit/It)/(Pi0/I0)]-1
                                                          
25 Keasey and Short, ibid
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Where Pit = share price at the close of the t th day of trading
Pi0= offer price
It  = FT All Share Index level at the close of the t th day of trading
I0 = FT All Share Index level at flotation
Measuring excess returns in this level assumes that the betas of the IPO firms is the
same as that of the market as a whole. As previously discussed, this is a strong
assumption, but one which has been used previously in the literature.
For the purposes of the study, the immediate excess return was focused upon. To that
end the dependent variable is constructed to show excess return on the first day of
trading.
For the current sample of 175 firms, the average underpricing on the initial day of
trading was 7.9% as indicated. However, the standard deviation of 15.2% is
illustrative of the variation in underpricing across the individual firms. The level of
7.9% is lower than reported in recent studies. This may in part be reflected in the
relatively large number of sizeable flotations undertaken in the period. (such as the
privatisation of the water and regional electricity companies). Over the other periods
which were examined (days 5,10,15 and 20) the level of underpricing and standard
deviation of returns were broadly similar.
The relevant statistics are shown in the table below.
Day 1 Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
Average
Return
7.89% 8.55% 8.05% 8.34% 8.34%
Std.
Deviation
15.24% 14.61% 15.22% 14.45% 15.59%
The variables used are shown in the model below.
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EXRTN = B0 + B1.BIG + B2.MBO + B3.PBV + B4.PSAL + B5.TURNOVER + 
B6.NAV + B7.PRE + B8.FUNDS + B9.RETAINED
Where the variables are defined as follows
Dependent Variable Description
EXRTN Level of excess return
Independent Variables
BIG Dummy variable coded 1 is the company was a government
privatisation issue
MBO Dummy variable coded 1 if the new issue was an MBO
PBV Share price to Book value ration
PSAL Share price to sales ratio
TURNOVER Turnover in the period immediately pre float
NAV Nav in the period immediately pre float
PRE Pre-tav profit in the period immediately pre float
FUNDS Funds raised in the flotation
RETAINED Percentage of equity retained by shareholders in the float
The focus of this study is to determine any differentiation between the returns
produced by MBO firms in the initial post issue period and in addition to determine
whether any effect, if indeed one exists, persists for a period of time into the post issue
period. For that purpose each study was conducted for a number of different time
periods.
The variable BIG was included in the model to see whether any differential effects in
underpricing existed for those much larger government privatisation issue and in
addition to see whether this effect persisted through time. MBO is a dummy variable
used to separate the MBOs from the other firms in the dataset. PSAL is a variable
which relates the market value of the company to its turnover. The notion behind
including this variable is to see whether those companies which have a lower price to
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sales ratio (and hence may present better ‘value’) produce higher excess returns.
Similarly, the PBV variable relates the market value of the company to its asset value.
The notion here is to test whether lower price to book value companies have positive
valuation characteristics which produce higher excess returns. TURNOVER, NAV
and PRE variables measure sales, assets and profitability of the firms. The inclusion of
these variables seeks to show if any relation between these variables and the level of
excess returns exists. FUNDS measures the amount of funds raised in the flotation.
The idea here is to determine if floats which raise less funds are potentially less risky
and hence may exhibit lower degrees of excess retains. RETAINED measures the
percentage of funds retained in the company post flotation. The notion here is that less
risky firms (which should produce lower excess returns) have high retention levels.
5.3  Empirical  Methods
The empirical analysis conducted was that of an ordinary least squares regression
(OLS) with excess return as dependent variable and the explanatory variables as
indicated in the previous section. The models were run on the MicroFit 4
econometrics package.
The model was found to suffer from a heteroscedasticity problem. In the models run
where the explanatory variable was excess return 15 and 20 days after flotation, the
model was found to suffer from a heteroscdasticity problem. The result of the
existence of this problem was that while the parameter estimates were linear and
unbiased they were not minimum variance in the class of all unbiased estimators. The
absence of the minimum variance criterion places a question on the validity of any
inference which can be drawn from the model. As a result, the heteroscedasticity
problem had to be solved in some way. The traditional method of solving such a
problem is to determine which of the independent variables is causing the variances to
be non-constant and then to ‘scale’ the regression equation to resolve the problem.
Unfortunately, in this case such a procedure would be very difficult to accomplish
effectively due to the number of independent variables. However, the same result can
be achieved by the use of White’s heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. This
approach does not attempt to identify the specific cause of the problem but makes an
algebraic manipulation to cure the problem. Heteroscedasitity consistent parameters
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are shown for all the models but as intimated, they are only strictly relevant to the last
two studies.
5.4  Model  Results
The regression results are shown below.
Day 1 Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
R Squared 0.075 0.114 0.095 0.070 0.0811
F Statistic 1.476 2.363 * 1.919** 1.3378 1.6186
* - significant at the 5% level
** - significant at the 10% level
The results of the model estimation procedure reveals that both R squared values and
F statistics are low. This is not entirely unexpected as high R squared values would
mean that it were possible to forecast which stocks would produce high excess
returns. Nevertheless, the low values do mean that the level of security which can be
attached to inference from the paramater estimates is modest. The individual
parameter results are discussed below.
Parameter Results
Regressor Day 1 Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
BIG NO NO NO NO YES (10%)
MBO YES (10%) YES (5%) NO NO NO
PBV NO YES (10%) YES (10%) YES (5%) YES (10%)
PSAL NO NO NO NO NO
TURNOVER NO NO NO NO NO
NAV NO YES (10%) NO NO NO
PRE NO NO NO NO NO
FUNDS NO NO NO NO NO
52
RETAINED NO YES (5%) NO NO NO
5.5  Discussion of Results
From the panel of results as presented above the following conclusions can be drawn.
The results with respect to the MBO variable are most interesting. The variable is
significant over the first two observation periods but is in fact signed negatively. This
is indicative of MBOs exhibiting lower levels of excess return in the immediate
aftermarket. The variable ceases to have any significance over other time scales.
This result would seen to stack up against the earlier anecdotal evidence that MBO
firms outperform the universe of other flotations. However, in this context it must be
noted that even though the time frame of the study extends to twenty days of trading
into the after-market, this in itself is not that long a time window. It may well be that
the MBOs do outperform over longer (six months) time periods but this effect is not
captured by the dataset used in this study.
Interestingly, MBOs are appearing to exhibit lower excess return in the immediate
aftermarket. This phenomenon may well be explainable in terms of the signalling
literature discussed earlier in this thesis.
As mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter, venture capitalists spend a
great deal of time vetting potential investments before actually committing funds. In
that sense they may, by investing in the first place, be sending a credible signal to the
equity investors who subsequently invest in the MBO on listing that the investment is
of ‘high’ quality. In the same way that using a high reputation sponsor is purported to
act as a signal of potential investment quality (and hence lower excess return), being a
former MBO may produce the same net effect. This postulation would explain the
results as found.
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To discuss the other findings in brief, the most prevalent finding is that the PBV
variable is significant over a number of time periods. This would point to shares with
a higher asset backing producing a higher level of excess returns. This would be
consistent with investments which exhibit better ‘value’ characteristics producing
larger excess returns in the aftermarket. The fact that the first day result was negative
may point to the gradual buying interest in these stocks increasing over time.
The final result to comment upon relates to the fact the the dummy  variable
representing the government privatisation issues produced a statistically positive result
for the last time period in the study. This indicates abnormal excess returns from such
stocks, but only after some time.
6.  CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to examine the venture capital market in the UK with particular
emphasis on MBO flotations. The results in section four do not square entirely with
the evidence introduced earlier. The phenomenon of outperformance from venture
capital backed flotations was not evidenced by the results. This may be due to the
relatively short time period examined  but nevertheless, the results stand.
The  reasons for this  result may have  to do with the ‘signalling’ of underlying IPO
quality alluded to in earlier work. What is interesting to note is that while the presence
of a venture capitalists via his/her involvement in an MBO acts as a positive signal to
investors by apparently reducing uncertainty over the prospects for the business and
the associated level of excess return, the use of a highly reputable sponsor appears to
have no such effect.
The evidence presented from work into longer term returns from MBOs (and indeed
MBIs) indicates that they do produce excess returns relative  to other asset classes.
This in fact does tie in with the scenario outlined. It would be consistent for ‘high
quality’ IPOs to produce low immediate excess returns in accordance with the
signalling effect but for these investments to produce better long term returns as a
function of their higher quality.
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